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Tree Preservation Ordinances:
Sacrificing Private Timber Rights
on the Diminutive Altar
of Public Benefit
by Brian E. Daughdrill °
and Kathryn M. Zickert**
I.

INTRODUCTION

Georgia is a state dominated by its forests and forest industries.
Forests have defined the state since it was settled in the 1730s. Early
settlers of the state enjoyed both the bounty provided by Georgia's
forests and the use of those forests as they cleared land and built homes.
Early forest products, in addition to lumber, included naval stores, "a
tar-like substance which was used to caulk the seams of wood ships;"'
and live oak "knees," curved portions of the tree used as deck supports
in wooden ship building. Indeed, Revolutionary War hero Nathaniel
Greene, who had vast holdings on Cumberland Island, first pursued the
sale of live oak knees found in Georgia.' Commercial logging began in
the 1880s after Georgia recovered from the ravages of the Civil War.

* Litigation Associate and Land Use Group Member, Seyfarth Shaw. Valdosta State
University (B.F.A., 1988); Mercer University, Walter F. George School of Law (J.D., magna
cum laude, 2000). Licensed Real Estate Broker; Landowner Member, Georgia Forestry
Association.
** Litigation Partner and Chair, Land Use Group, Seyfarth Shaw. Vanderbilt
University (B.A., cum laude, 1976); Emory University (J.D., 1979).
1. Klaus Steinbeck, ChangingTimes Bring ChangingForests, TOPS, Summer 1997, at
28.
2.

See id. (citing V. WOOD, LWVE OAKING SOUTHERN, TIMBER FOR TALL SHIPS (1981)).

Of historical interest is the fact the live oak used to construct the U.S.S. Constitution was
sawn from Georgia live oak trees. See id.
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Admittedly, forest-related industries have not always been sensitive
Indiscriminate
to the environmental impact of timber harvesting.
logging left mountains denuded and subject to wild fires fed by the
plethora of logging debris. By the late 1930s even the Piedmont was
deforested, and "one could ride for 40 miles without seeing a pine tree."3
Once-clear trout streams, such as the Oconee, Altamaha, and the
Ocmulgee, ran red with silt as the "deep rich, dark topsoil," described a
century earlier by William Bartram, eroded.4
Deliberate reforestation began in the 1890s with early efforts by
farmers to replant wild pine seedlings, and in 1929 the University of
Georgia opened one of the first state nurseries for longleaf, loblolly, and
slash pine seedlings.5 The growing number of private timberland
owners found a new market for their timber in 1936 when Union Bag
Corporation (later renamed Union Camp) located a kraft paper mill in
Savannah and, today, that market and related markets have become
Georgia's leading industry.6
Indeed, forestry is the state's largest industry. While industry-owned
forests attract the most attention, seventy-two percent of the over 23.6
million acres of commercial forest land in Georgia is owned by 695,000
farmers and other nonindustrial private forest landowners.' Twentyfour percent of the total manufacturing output in the state is in forest
or forest-related industries, resulting in over $19 billion in direct
contributions to Georgia's economy in 1999." Twenty-three percent of
all Georgia workers are employed in the forest industry.9 Forests cover
the state with deciduous"0 and evergreen trees about evenly distributed
and loblolly pine as the most abundant conifer.1' Every county in the
state, including urban counties, is significantly benefitted by the forest
industry in some respect. 2 Of the 159 counties in Georgia, 38 are now
considered urban because they encompass the eight largest metropolitan

3. Id.
4.

WILLIAM BARTRAM, TRAVELs THROUGH NORTH & SOUTH CAROLINA, GEORGIA,EAST

& WEST FLORIDA 65-71 (Penguin Books 1996) (1791).
5. See id.
6. See id.
7. See Ben Jackson, Forestryon a Budget (last modified May 1998) <http://www.for.../
index.php3?docID=49&docHistory%5B%5D=68docHistory%5B%5D=2>.
8. See Forest Industry Thriving, AUGUSTA CHRONICLE, Feb. 28, 1999.
9. See Jackson, Forestry on a Budget, supra note 7.
10. "Deciduous" refers to trees which shed all of their foilage at least annually. Note
that magnolias, with their distinctive broad leaves, are not deciduous but, like conifers, are
categorized as evergreen.
11. See Steinbeck, Changing Times, supra note 1, at 29.
12. See id.
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areas; however, 4 million acres of commercial forest land"s exists even
within these urban areas. 4
However, these same counties, to whom forestry as an industry is
inescapably essential, represent perhaps the biggest threat to the
continued viability of the industry. These counties and municipalities
impose limitations upon development and compel conservation of private
timber resources through the enactment of "tree protection ordinances."
Although ostensibly designed to ameliorate air-quality problems and
erosion, or to serve aesthetic concerns, in reality these ordinances
threaten the very essence of the timber industry. Unlike most conservation efforts, these tree ordinances are a patchwork of often-inconsistent
legislative efforts by various counties and municipalities bereft of any
state-established procedures or guidelines, much less any regard for the
state's largest industry. 5 Development in urban areas ironically has
reduced the influence of the timber industry at a time when developers
and foresters most need to cooperate. Only a cooperative effort will
foster legislation that will protect the environment and allow the
maximum sustainable yield from development and timber harvesting.
Unfortunately, most local legislation reflects a disregard for the integral
relationship between development and forest resources, as well as a
disregard for the economic consequences of the legislation upon those
industries.
Particularly problematic in the passage of these ordinances is the
disregard, or perhaps ignorance, of the fact that standing timber is a
form of discrete, severable real property. 6 It "'may be owned and
possessed by one person, while the soil belongs to another.""' 7 "Conveyances of... timber are treated as deeds, are to be executed with the
same formality, and may be recorded as such[, and] in fact, have all the

13. "Commercial forest land" refers to land held predominantly for the production of
timber. Commercial forest land does not include such things as a wooded five-acre

homesite.
14. See Steinbeck, Changing Times, supra note 1, at 29.
15. Other conservation efforts, both of natural and historic resources, such as the
Historic Preservation Statute, Official Code of Georgia Annotated ("O.C.G.A.") §§ 44-10-21
to -31 (1981 & Supp. 2000), and the Control of Soil Erosion and Sedimentation Act,
O.C.G.A. § 12-7-1 to -18 (1996 & Supp. 2000), are statutorily controlled by state enabling
legislation. No similar specific enabling statute exists for tree ordinances. Of particular
interest is that forestry management, including harvesting, is specifically excluded from
the Control of Soil Erosion and Sedimentation Act. O.C.G.A. § 12-7-17(5).
16. See Hutchins v. King, 68 U.S. 53, 59 (1863); see also Laird v. United States, 115 F.
Supp. 931, 933 (W.D. Wis. 1953) (stating a timber owner owns so much of the dirt
underlying the trees as is necessary to support the timber).
17. Smith v. Alexander & Bland, 168 Ga. 382, 384, 148 S.E. 98, 99 (1929).
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incidents of ordinary deeds to realty."8 It is only when timber is
severed from land that it becomes personal property. 9
Traditional judicial analysis has long required constitutional scrutiny
of the impact upon real property of zoning and similar land use
regulations, but these courts have not afforded the same scrutiny to the
impact of similar regulations upon timber rights in Georgia. 20 Had
zoning consideration been applied to tree ordinances, undoubtedly many
would fail. To be valid, zoning ordinances must "serve some public
purpose, ...

[be] reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the

purpose, and.., not [be] unduly oppressive upon the persons regulated."21 If a zoning ordinance actually appropriates property to the state
instead of "merely" preventing "the owner from making a use which
interferes with paramount rights of the public," then it is unconstitutional.22
Zoning rises to the level of an unconstitutional, uncompensated taking
when the ordinance destroys the economic value of a parcel of land.23
At the point a zoning ordinance destroys all economic value of the entire
parcel, it has become unduly oppressive and is said to be an invalid
exercise of police power.24 In contrast, tree protection ordinances by
definition destroy the economic value of every tree rendered unharvestable by the ordinance. No one would deny a taking had occurred if a
local authority were randomly to pick twenty-five percent of the lots
platted in a subdivision and forbid the developer from using the lots in
any fashion. Yet, due to the severable nature of standing timber, tree
protection ordinances have this precise effect.
In enacting those tree ordinances, local authorities should look beyond
the judicial carte blanche customarily given legislative decisions. The
traditional judicial complacency with statutory enactments should yield
to the "regulatory takings" analysis judicially developed in the Twentieth

18. Id. (emphasis added).
19. 68 U.S. at 56.
20. See Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 397 (1926).
21. Cannon v. Coweta County, 260 Ga. 56, 58, 389 S.E.2d 329, 330 (1990) (emphasis
added).
22. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393,417 (1922) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
23. The destruction of all economic value is one federal standard for a regulatory
taking. See, e.g., Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015 (1992).
Note that Georgia employs the significant detriment test. See Parking Ass'n v. City of
Atlanta, 264 Ga. 764, 765, 450 S.E.2d 200, 202 (1994) (stating a zoning ordinance's validity
will be rebutted upon a showing that the zoning presents "a significant detriment to the
landowner and is insubstantially related to the public health, safety, morality and
welfare."); see also Pope v. City of Atlanta, 242 Ga. 331, 334, 249 S.E.2d 16, 19 (1986).
24. See Eide v. Sarasota County, 908 F.2d 716, 721 (1990).

20011

TREE PRESERVATION ORDINANCES

709

Century to reflect the increasingly regulatory environment within which
land owners today find themselves operating. Section II of this Article
will trace the evolution of the Fifth Amendment uncompensated takings
jurisprudence from its pre-incorporation status in Barron v. Mayor of
Baltimore25 to the regulatory takings analysis developed in the
Twentieth Century. Section III will define exactions and expound upon
the "roughly proportionate" requirement announced by the Supreme
Court in Dolan v. City of Tigard.26
Section IV will review tree ordinances as a regulatory taking under
the analysis propounded by the Supreme Court in PennsylvaniaCoal Co.
v. Mahon," with particular focus on the impact of a resource's "severability" on the takings analysis. Section V will analyze and compare
several tree ordinances in effect in Georgia and offer suggestions that
would minimize the takings effect of those ordinances.
II.

HISTORY OF TAKING ANALYSIS

The Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution, as well as
virtually duplicative language in the Georgia Constitution, provides that
private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation."8 Some fifty years after that amendment was adopted as part of
the Bill of Rights, the United States Supreme Court held that the Fifth
Amendment did not apply to states and that the ruination of a
commercial wharf by the City of Baltimore via sediment deposited by
city-diverted streams was not compensable under the Fifth Amendment.29 It was not until the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment in
1868 that states, and their "creatures" such as municipal corporations
and counties," became equally obligated to provide fair compensation
to owners of private property damaged or destroyed in the name of
public interest."1
In adjudicating takings claims, the courts, while still deferential to
legislative enactments, have been more mindful of legislative abuse of
the protection afforded by the Fifth Amendment. 'When this seemingly

25. 32 U.S. 243 (1833).
26. 512 U.S. 374, 391 (1994).
27. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
28. U.S. CONST. amend. V ("nor shall private property be taken for public use, without
just compensation"); GA. CONST. art. I, § 3, I ("private property shall not be taken or
damaged for public purposes without just and adequate compensation being first paid").
29. See Barron, 32 U.S. at 249.
30. See Burton v. DeKalb County, 202 Ga. App. 676, 678, 415 S.E.2d 647, 649 (1992).
31. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. The application of the Fifth Amendment's Takings
Clause to the states was recognized by the Supreme Court by 1897. See Chicago,
Burlington & Quincy R.R. v. City of Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 234 (1897).
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absolute protection is found to be qualified by the police power, the
natural tendency of human nature is to extend the qualification more
and more until at last private property disappears."32
The Twentieth Century saw increasing friction between private
landowners, whose property was restricted in the name of public welfare,
and governing authorities dancing to avoid the need for just compensation. "Taking" came to mean more than just the actual physical
possession of once-private land. Prior to Pennsylvania Coal Co., most
courts recognized only categorical takings-those that result in "direct
appropriation" or "practical ouster," i.e. the absolute destruction of our
prohibition to use property." Justice Holmes initiated the renaissance
away from such severe requirements in 1922 in Pennsylvania Coal Co.
when he wrote, "[Wihile property may be regulated to a certain extent,
if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking."34 Alarmed
at what he perceived to be unconstitutional legislative encroachments
upon private property interests, Justice Holmes stated: "We are in
danger of forgetting that a strong public desire to improve the public
condition is not enough to warrant achieving the desire by a shorter cut
than the constitutional way of paying for the change."35
In 1978, in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York
("Penn Central")," in what has come to be known as the "primer" on
regulatory takings cases, Penn Central appealed New York City's refusal
to approve its plans to construct a fifty-story office building over Grand
Central Station. 7 Citing the "historic significance" of Grand Central
Station, the City's Preservation Commission disapproved the addition
despite the fact that the original facility was designed and constructed
for just this sort of later addition.38 The United States Supreme Court
refused to find a taking because Penn Central was not denied an
economic return from the Terminal-it was merely regulated in its right
to develop the air rights. 39 However, the Court took particular pains

32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

260 U.S. at 415.
505 U.S. at 1014 (reviewing Pennsylvania Coal Co.).
260 U.S. at 415.
Id. at 416.
438 U.S. 104 (1978).
Id. at 117.

38. Id.
39. Id. at 138. The argument may be made that because "air rights" were severable
and transferable, the Court did consider the issue of severability when it held that
"'[tiaking' jurisprudence does not divide a single parcel into discrete segments and attempt
to determine whether rights in a particular segment have been entirely abrogated." Id. at
130. The author notes, however, that the Court retreated from this position in Lucas
wherein the Court commented that it was not clear to which property interest the
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to "review the factors that have shaped the jurisprudence of the Fifth
Amendment."4 ° The Court noted its own historical difficulty in trying to
define a "taking," stating that there is no "set formula for determining
when justice and fairness" require compensation.41 Describing the type
of scrutiny as "essentially [an] ad hoc ... factual inquir[y]," the Court
identified several relevant factors to be considered: (1) the economic
impact of the regulation; (2) the extent to which the regulation interferes
with "distinct investment-backed expectations;" and (3) whether the
regulations compel a "physical invasion."4 2 The Court noted previous
cases upholding land-use regulations that destroyed or adversely affected
real property interests but wrote that when there are "government
actions that may be characterized as acquisitions of resources to permit
or facilitate uniquely public functions," those actions have "often been
held to constitute takings."43
Shortly after Penn Central, in Agins v. City of Tiburon,"' the Court
again addressed a takings claim within the context of evaluating a city's
denial of a rezoning petition, holding that zoning regulations must
substantially advance legitimate state interests to survive a takings
challenge.45 The Court upheld a city ordinance that limited development because it "neither prevent[ed] the best use of [the property] ...
nor extinguish[ed] a fundamental attribute of ownership."46
Following Agins the Supreme Court very quickly addressed whether
a temporary taking requires compensation in First English Evangelical
Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles.47 The Court held that
temporary takings are not different in kind from permanent takings and
also require compensation.48 At issue was whether Los Angeles County
was required to compensate an owner for lost use of its property during
the interim between the enactment of an ordinance and its subsequent
invalidation.4 9 The Court held that "'[n]othing in the Just Compensa-

"destruction of all economic value" was to be applied and that "air rights" as a severable
property interest are a recent legislative creature as opposed to mineral and timber rights
recognized at common law as distinct, severable estates. 505 U.S. at 1016 n.7.
40. 438 U.S. at 123.
41. Id. at 124.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 128.
44. 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
45. Id. at 261.
46. Id. at 262.
47. 482 U.S. 304, 311 (1987).
48. Id. at 318.
49. Id.
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tion Clause suggests that 'takings' must be permanent and irrevocable,"' and that it was the "'owner's loss, not the taker's gain, which is
the measure of the value of the property taken.'"5" The Court stated
that its decision did not mean the property owner could compel the
government to exercise eminent domain, but once a court determines a
taking has occurred, the government must amend the regulation,
withdraw the regulation, or exercise eminent domain." However, when
the government's activities have already worked a taking of all use of
the property, "no subsequent action by the government can relieve it of
the duty to provide compensation for the period during which the taking
was effective."53
In 1992 in Lucas v.South Carolina Coastal Council, the Supreme
Court addressed a South Carolina ordinance that completely proscribed
any construction on beachfront property on Isle of Palms.54 After Lucas
purchased two beachfront residential lots in 1986, South Carolina
enacted its 1988 Beachfront Management Act,55 which barred Lucas
from constructing any permanent structure on his property. The Act
was designed to protect South Carolina's coastal property from erosion
because it became aggravated by development. 6
The Court noted this case fell into what previous takings analysis had
identified as one of two types of injury warranting categorical treatment-those enactments in which regulations deny all economic benefit
or productive use.57 However, of particular relevance is the Court's
continuing acknowledgment that governmental action does not necessarily need to obliterate all of a property owner's interests to merit
constitutional scrutiny: "[T]he rhetorical force of our 'deprivation of all
economically feasible use' rule is greater than its precision, since the rule
does not make clear the 'property interest' against which the loss of
value is to be measured."58 When no productive or economically

50.

Id. (quoting San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 657 (1981)

(Brennan, J., dissenting)).
51.
52.
53.

Id. at 319 (quoting United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 261 (1946)).
Id. at 321.
Id.

54. 505 U.S. 1003, 1007 (1992).
55.
56. Id. at 1008.
57. Id. at 1015, 1031-32.
58. Id. at 1016 n.7. ("When, for example, a regulation requires a developer to leave
90% of a rural tract in its natural state, it is unclear whether we would analyze the
situation as one in which the owner has been deprived of all economically beneficial use
of the burdened portion of the tract, or as one in which the owner has suffered a mere
diminution in value of the tract as a whole .... The answer . .. may lie in how the

owner's reasonable expectations have been shaped by the State's law of property.").
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beneficial use of land is permitted, it is "less realistic to indulge [the]
usual assumption that the legislature is simply 'adjusting the benefits
and burdens of economic life.'"59 Writing for the majority, Justice
Scalia stated that when land is required to be left substantially in its
natural state, there is a "heightened risk that private property is being
pressed into some form of public service under the guise of mitigating
serious public harm.""
Noncategorical takings cases, i.e. those cases in which the landowner
is not compelled to suffer a physical invasion or when economic value
has not been totally destroyed, have given the Court ample opportunity
to expound upon the nature of the "ad hoc, factual inquiry" required by
the Court in Penn Central."' As used by the Court in Agins, regulations affecting private property interests must "substantially advance
legitimate state interests" to survive a takings challenge.
This
standard was further developed in Nollan v. California Coastal
Commission,63 when Justice Scalia wrote that use restrictions must be
"'reasonably necessary to the effectuation of a substantial government
purpose.'"' This "verbal formulation" 65 is not that the "State 'could
rationally have decided'" standard from Equal Protection and substantive Due Process jurisprudence. 6
7
The Court attempted to clarify this issue in Dolan v. City of Tigard
by stating that regulations must be "roughly proportionate" to the
impact caused by the proposed land use.66 In Dolan a property store
owner protested the City of Tigard's right to require the dedication of a
portion of her property as a pedestrian and bike path as a condition
precedent to the issuance of a building permit to allow her to expand her
store. When Dolan sought to expand her hardware store from 9700
square feet to 17,600 square feet and pave a 39-space parking lot, the
City of Tigard required her to maintain, as a public greenway, the flood

59. Id. at 1017 (citing Penn Central Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 124).
60. Id. at 1018 (criticizing Justice Blackmun's dissent wherein he suggested that Lucas
had not been deprived of all economic benefit because he "still can enjoy other attributes
of ownership, such as the right to exclude others ....
Petitioner can picnic, swim, camp
in a tent, or live on the property in a movable trailer." Id. at 1044 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting)).
61. 438 U.S. at 123.
62. 447 U.S. at 260.
63. 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
64. Id. at 834 (quoting Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 127).
65. Id. at 836 n.3.
66. Id. (quoting Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 466 (1981)).
67. 512 U.S. 374 (1994).
68. Id. at 391.
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plain along a creek that bordered her property and, further, to dedicate
a strip of her land for a pedestrian and bike path as defined in the City's
Master Plan. The City's development code already required the
landowner to maintain fifteen percent of her property as open space.
The City's Land Use Board of Appeals found the extra dedication
requirement "reasonably related" to the impact caused by the larger
building and additional impervious surface of a parking lot.69 Both the
Oregon Court of Appeals and the Oregon Supreme Court affirmed, and
the Supreme Court granted certiorari.7 °
In reversing the state courts, the Supreme Court noted that "had the
city simply required petitioner to dedicate a strip of land ... rather than
conditioning the grant of her permit to redevelop her property on such
a dedication, a taking would have occurred."7' The Court thus reaffirmed its previous direction in Pennsylvania Coal, stating that "[a]
strong public desire to improve the public condition [will not] warrant
achieving the desire by a shorter cut than the constitutional way of
paying for the change."72
In Dolan the Court expressly rejected the alleged reasonable relationship to a public purpose, instead holding that exactions imposed as a
condition of the permitting process must bear a "rough proportionality"
to the impact caused by the development. 73 The local authority is not
required to make a "precise mathematical calculation" but must make
some sort of "individualized determination that the required dedication
is related both in nature and extent to the impact of the proposed
development."74 Finally, the local authority must make "some effort to
quantify its findings in support of the dedication ...

beyond the

conclusory statement that [the exaction] could offset some of the [impact
of development]." 75 Because the City of Tigard made no effort of this
sort to quantify findings showing rough proportionality, the Court
reversed and remanded the case.76
After nearly a century of judicial distillation, takings claims essentially have been classified into either the categorical or noncategorical
varieties. When governmental action compels physical invasion or,
through regulation, destroys all economic value, the Court has not

69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.

Id. at 377-82.
Id. at 383.
Id. at 384.
Id. at 396 (citing Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 416).
Id. at 391.
Id.
Id. at 395-96 (emphasis added).
Id. at 396.
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hesitated to find a categorical taking. Noncategorical regulatory takings,
the more problematic classification, require an ad hoc factual inquiry
into the investment backed expectations, the nature of the government
action, and the economic impact of the regulation. Tree protection
ordinances fall into the noncategorical classification requiring closer
review.
III.

TREE ORDINANCES AS EXACTIONS

A. Law
In determining what type of judicial review is applicable to tree
ordinances, the courts must first determine how to classify these
regulations. According to the court in City of Annapolis v. Waterman,7 7
local authorities that regulate development do so through a variety of
78
regulatory tools including conditions, reservations, and dedications.
Conditions, potentially the least demanding of the regulatory methods,
"merely limit[] the method in which a property owner may thereafter use
the property."79 Conditions not equating to exactions are normally
reviewed under the regulatory takings analysis: "(1) whether ... a
public purpose exists, and, if so, (2) whether the regulation deprives the
property owner of all viable economic use of the entire property at
issue. "' °
More burdensome on developers and more likely to trigger the
"exaction analysis" are conditions that mandate reservations or
dedications. Reservations are the "setting aside of specified land for a
specific public purpose."8 These reservations include "greenbelts" and
subdivision parks. They do not require conveyance to the government
but do restrict the right of the developer to use the reserved land for any
purpose other than the restricted purpose. 2 In contrast, dedications
ordinarily require the conveyance of an interest in the land to the
government for the general public.83 Streets and utility extensions are
typical dedications; once installed, the developer turns ownership,
control, and operation over to the government. Of critical importance in
determining whether a dedication or a reservation exists is determining

77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

745 A.2d 1000 (Md. 2000).
Id. at 1008, 1010-11.
Id. at 1011-12 (emphasis added).
Id. at 1012.
Id. at 1011 (citing 83 AM. JUR. 2D Zoning and Planning § 563 (1983)).
Id.
Id. at 1010.
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for whom the land is conveyed.84 When the required conveyance, for
instance, is to a homeowner's association for the subdivision, this kind
of conveyance is said to be private. "[T]here is no such thing as a
dedication between [the developer]
and individuals. The public must be
85
a party to every dedication."

When the dedication or reservation is for the public at large, as
opposed to benefitting only those residing within the development, or
when an "in lieu" fee is imposed as an alternative, there is an exaction
generally governed by the standards discussed by the Supreme Court in
Dolan.S8

Because timber is discrete, severable real property, ordinances that
proscribe its harvest cannot be reviewed as conditions that merely
regulate the method by which the timber owner may use her timber.
Those ordinances forbid any use but the "public" use, and they require
the landowner to reserve or dedicate "a resource, a forest, as a condition
precedent to receiving a permit to improve or subdivide her property.""
Reforestation requirements "are ... an exaction, or a condition

precedent, imposed on the landowner." 8
Assuming arguendo that an "essential nexus" 9 even exists between
the prohibition or restriction on the exercise of timber rights and the
impact caused by developing a parcel of property, the Supreme Court
held in Dolan v. City of Tigard,9 ° that the local authority must still
demonstrate "rough proportionality" between the exaction and the needs
caused by the particular development. 9 "Rough proportionality" is an
express rejection of "reasonable relationship," which describes the
minimal level of scrutiny under Equal Protection analysis.
The Court's holding in Dolan opened the door for conditions, imposed
as a prerequisite to permit issuance, to be reviewed under the judicial
takings analysis already applicable to outright dedications. Of prime
import is the Court's requiring local authorities to make "individualized
determination[s] that the required dedication is related both in nature

84. Id. at 1011.
85. Id. (citing Jackson v. Gastonia, 98 S.E.2d 444, 447 (1957)).
86. Id. at 1012.
87. Stacy P. Silber, Afforestation Under Maryland's Forest Conservation Act and
Selected County Codes: Viability of this Land Use Regulation Pre- and Post-Dolanv. City
of Tigard, 4 U. BALIT. J. ENVTL. L. 53, 61 (1994).
88. Id. at 76.
89. See Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 837 (1987).

90. 512 U.S. 374 (1994).
91. Id. at 389.
92. Id.
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development."93

B. Analysis and Application
The problem facing local authorities with their tree ordinances is,
somewhat understandably, that in the interest of administrative
efficiency these ordinances are inevitably drafted to apply "across the
board." Indeed, because these blanket requirements rarely relate to a
scientific analysis of the cause and effect of development, the "Achilles'
heel of the [tree protection ordinance] remains its application of uniform
standards to all land developers regardless of the specific impact that
the particular developer causes."94 Challenges to the requirements of
these ordinances should "force the applicable government to reevaluate
why the specific thresholds apply equally to subdivisions of all sizes, and
why the differing ...planting requirements [are] adopted for different
Trees' discrete, severable nature and tree
land classifications."95
ordinances' purpose to benefit the general population of the county or
city require local authorities to draft ordinances carefully to provide for
individual analysis of the burden imposed by each development rather
than the current blanket mandates frequently imposed.
Admittedly, this requirement will increase the administrative burden
of local authorities wishing to enact these ordinances, but certainly the
research already exists to quantify the atmospheric and aesthetic value
of residential forests.9" The existence of the data and the demand of
"rough proportionality" by the Court in Dolan at least encourages a caseby-case analysis of each development. It is illogical to assert that a
development in a once-open field causes an even remotely similar burden
to a development that levels several acres of distinguished live oaks. Yet
the across-the-board language of most ordinances requires just this
ludicrous result.
Particularly onerous are ordinances that impose punitive replacement
standards without any individualized analysis that these standards are
required to be roughly proportionate to the burden caused by tree
removal.9" Punitive replacement standards ignore the logic that a

93. Id. at 391.
94. Silber, supra note 87, at 79.
95. Id.
96. The University of Georgia Warnell School of Forest Resources' Dr. Kim Coder
published an article, specifically quantifying, in dollar amounts, the value of urban forests
per acre in reducing pollution, stemming erosion, reducing heating and cooling costs, and
reducing noise pollution. See Dr. Kim Coder, Identified Benefits of Community Trees and
Forests, Oct. 1996, available in http://www.forestry.uga.edu/warnell/serv.
97. See DEKALB COUNTY, GA. ORDINANCE § 14-39(g)(8)(e) (1999).
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mature tree at the end of its growth cycle sequesters less carbon dioxide
than a young tree entering its peak growth cycle." Further, punitive
ordinances reflect legislative short sightedness by preserving trees
nearing the end of their leafy little lives.
For instance, DeKalb County's Tree Protection Ordinance99 imposes
a blanket requirement that any "specimen tree"'0 0 that is cut must be
replaced with one-and-a-half times its diameter in replacement trees
without any individualized determination or scientific finding that these
replacement requirements are necessary to offset the burden caused by
the cutting of the tree. 10 1 The City of Alpharetta similarly requires
that any specimen tree designated to be saved that is then cut must be
replaced with twice the density-unit value of the tree removed. 10 2 In
contrast, the Fulton County Tree Preservation Ordinance 10 3 and its
Administrative Guidelines for residential development require a
straight-line replacement for specimen trees. For example, if a thirtyinch tree is removed (with a density unit value of 14.7) it must be
replaced with trees totaling the same density unit.0 4 Further, Fulton
County awards double-density credits where a developer reforests oncebarren land.0 5 Similarly, the Cobb County Tree Preservation and
Replacement Ordinance"° requires only that a minimum density
requirement be met. 07 Unlike the logical one-to-one replacement
standards required by Fulton and Cobb Counties, DeKalb County and
the City of Alpharetta impose their punitive replacement standards
without any finding that the requirements are related in nature and
extent to the burden caused by cutting the specimen trees.
Perhaps more problematic is an across-the-board refusal at least to
count trees located in undisturbed stream buffers toward density
requirements. DeKalb County, the only county that has so elected,
irrationally counts these trees toward density requirements for

98. Georgia Power's Project GREEN was based on this carbon-sequestration principal,
i.e. that by planting young pine plantations, known to absorb a specified quantity of carbon
dioxide per acre, Georgia Power could reduce its overall contribution to air-borne pollution.
99. DEKALB COUNTY, GA., ORDINANCE § 14-39.
100. A "specimen tree" is a hardwood or pine tree larger than thirty inches measured
"diameter at breast height," ("DBH") or a smaller tree such as dogwood measuring ten or
more inches DBH. Id. § 14-39(g)(8)(b).
101. Id. § 14-39(g)(8)(e).
102. ALPHARETrA, GA., CODE § 19-33 (1998). Density units are a measurement term
used by counties to "weigh" the density value of different types of trees.
103. FULTON COUNTY, GA., ORDINANCE §§ 26-396 to -403 (2000).
104. FULTON COUNTY, GA., ADMIN. GUIDELINES § III(C)(1)(f) (2000).

105.

Id. § III(C)(1)(b).

106.
107.

COBB COUNTY, GA., OFFICIAL CODE §§ 50-216 to -255 (2000).
Id. § 50-223.
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commercial and industrial site development but refuses to allow
residential developers the same prerogative and does so without an
individualized finding that a particular residential development imposes
a heightened burden. 1 8 In contrast, neither Cobb nor Fulton County's
ordinances forbid the developer from counting trees located within a
stream buffer or other undisturbed buffer toward overall density
requirements. The City of Marietta expressly authorizes developers to
count trees located in undisturbed buffers toward overall site density
requirements. 09
DeKalb County's ordinance also requires that all trees within the 100year flood plain be left undisturbed."0 Again, there is no provision for
individualized determination that development already burdened by the
topographical anomalies routinely present near water courses must also
be burdened with what is essentially a "super" density requirement.
Substantial timber resources may be located within these buffers, and
in these cases, requiring a landowner to reserve or dedicate that timber
to the public welfare effects a taking to the extent the benefit to the
public is outweighed by the cost to the landowner. Going an extra
step-prohibiting developers from at least counting the trees rendered
unharvestable by the buffer requirements-destroys the one remaining
economic value the timber has as a "tree bank" to meet the density
requirement for the balance of the property.
Finally, counties may run afoul of the requirement of individualized
determination of rough proportionality by imposing blanket buffer
requirements for logging operations without regard to the size of the
tract or its proximity to heavily traveled thoroughfares. Typically, these
requirements provide that if timber is to be harvested, then a certain
perimeter buffer of X feet in width must be maintained during harvesting. In this regard, DeKalb County, Fulton County, and Marietta all
impose buffers on all land harvested for timber-respectively, 75 feet, 25
feet, and 50 feet. Again, this fact demonstrates the arbitrariness of local
governments in selecting "appropriate" numbers."' Fulton County
also requires the buffer to be maintained only during the harvesting
operation, freeing the tract for development after the harvest2 as long as
the development meets the minimum density requirement."

108. DEKALB, GA., ORDINANCE § 14-39(g)(10)(d).
109. MARIETTA, GA., CODE § 712.08(D)(2)(a) (2000).
110. DEKALB, GA., ORDINANCE § 14-39(g)(10)(d).
111. See id. § 14-39(n)(1); see also FULTON COUNTY, GA., ADMIN. GUIDELINES
§ III(A)(3)(b); MARIETTA, GA., CODE § 712.08(D)(2)(a).
112. FULTON COUNTY, GA., ADMIN. GUIDELINES § III(A)(3)(b). In contrast, DeKalb's
Code requires that the buffer be maintained undisturbed for five years after a tract is
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The imposition of blanket buffers during the logging operation cannot,
by definition, be based on "rough proportionality." At the very least, if
buffers must be imposed, they should be tied to some independent
standard that reflects the burden caused by the land use. While perhaps
seeming insignificant, it is easy to calculate that even a twenty-five foot
buffer on the perimeter of a fifty-acre tract reserves over three and onehalf acres of timber for the public welfare. A seventy-five foot buffer, as
imposed by DeKalb County, requires the landowner to reserve almost
eleven acres of timber, almost a twenty-five percent exaction."'
Landowners who have maintained this property or timber growers who
planted these trees twenty or more years ago with the full expectation
they would harvest the boundary of their property now find themselves
having tied up significant resources in timber they can no longer
harvest.
Because the tree ordinances impose these restrictions for a public
purpose... (i.e., no one purports to argue the atmospheric improvements benefit only the land burdened), what might otherwise be
categorized as a mere "condition" rises to the level of dedication. The
discrete, severable nature of trees leaves no other viable economic use
for trees so restricted. As a dedication, or exaction, these ordinances
require the local authority to make some "individualized determination
that the required dedication is related both in nature and extent to the
impact of the proposed development" to pass constitutional muster. 5

harvested, effectively preventing any development of a tract so harvested. DEKALB, GA.,
ORDINANCE § 14-39(n)(6).
113. For mathematical calculations, a 50-acre tract has a perimeter of approximately
6356 linear feet (regardless of its shape). The author logged a 50-acre tract of 20-year-old
plantation pine in 1996 with a value of over $2100 per acre in pine timber alone. A 75-foot
buffer then would require the dedication of $23,000 out of the total timber value of the
tract of $105,000. Of critical importance in this analogy is that this timber was planted
in the early 1970s and "investment-backed expectations" were that all 50 acres would be
harvested. Buffer requirements like this discourage replanting in the buffer of commercial
timberland because there is no incentive to spend the $80 to $100 per acre to site-prep and
replant land that will be unharvestable because of the buffers.
114. See COBB COUNTY, GA., CODE § 50-219(a)(3) (stating the ordinance is intended to
"provide benefits to all the citizens of the community"); see also DEKALB, GA., ORDINANCE
§ 14-39(a)(2) (stating the legislature "hereby finds that the preservation of existing trees
is a public purpose"); FULTON COUNTY, GA., ORDINANCE § I(I)(B) (1999) (stating the
ordinance "benefits ... Fulton County citizens").
115. Id.

2001]

IV.

TREE PRESERVATION ORDINANCES

721

COMMERCIAL IMPRACTICALITY As GROUNDS FOR A TAKINGS CLAIM

Although drafted half a century after Justice Holmes recognized a
taking in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon,1 ' the opinion reached by
the Court in Penn CentralTransportationCo. v. City of New York ("Penn
Central")"7 more artfully defined why the challenged statute in
Pennsylvania Coal Co. effected a taking. In Penn Central the Court
listed "interfer[ence] with distinct investment-backed expectations" as a
significant factor in takings jurisprudence."" Justice Holmes earlier
stated a statute that makes it "commercially impracticable to mine
certain coal has very nearly the same effect for constitutional purposes
as appropriating or destroying it." 19 Critical to his opinion was the
fact that coal, like timber in the present instance, is a distinct estate in
land. In Pennsylvania Coal Co., the Kohler Act,12 ° purportedly as a
"legitimate exercise of police power," 2 ' "abolish[ed] what is recognized
in Pennsylvania as an estate in land-, a very valuable estate." 2 2
Justice Holmes stated, "'the right to coal consists in the right to mine it.'
What makes the right to mine coal valuable is that it can be exercised
with profit."'23
The coal mining company acquired its subsurface mineral rights by an
1878 deed. In May of 1921 the Pennsylvania legislature enacted the
Kohler Act, which forbade mining of coal if it would cause the subsidence
of any structure used as a home. The owner of the single home above
the company's coal vein brought a suit in equity to enjoin the Pennsylvania Coal Company from mining under his house. The coal company
argued that the surface owner purchased the land subject to the express
terms of the deed reserving the mineral rights to the coal company, and
that the Kohler Act, as applied, acted to divest the company of preexisting property rights.1 24 On its ultimate review by the United
States Supreme Court, the right to mine was upheld. The Court ruled
that by rendering coal mining commercially impractical, the Pennsylva125
nia legislature had effected a taking without just compensation.

116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.

260 U.S. 393 (1922).
438 U.S. 104 (1978).
Id. at 124.
260 U.S. at 414.
1921 Pa. Laws 1198.
260 U.S. at 412.
Id. at 414.
Id. (quoting Commonwealth v. Clearview Coal Co. (1917)).
260 U.S. at 416.
Id.
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The courts in Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis

("Keystone")1 2' and Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation

Ass'n 12 7 clarified what constitutes commercial impracticality.
In Keystone coal companies challenged the Pennsylvania Subsidence
Act, 12 which required in-site maintenance of fifty percent of the coal
beneath surface structures to prevent subsistence. The "zone of impact"
to which the act applied was defined as a rectangular area determined
by projecting a fifteen degree angle downward from the surface to the
coal seam beginning fifteen feet on each side of a structure. 129 As
applied to Keystone's coal rights, this regulation required leaving only
two percent of the total volume of coal in the seam for support.13 ° Of
preeminent importance to the Court was the conspicuous absence of a
"record in this case to support a finding, similar to ...

Pennsylvania

Coal, that the Subsidence Act [made] it impossible for petitioners to
profitably engage in their business, or that there has been undue
interference with their investment-backed expectations." 3' Particularly influential on the Court was the fact that either of the two "full
extraction" coal mining techniques employed by Keystone 3 2 routinely
left "considerable amounts" of coal still in the ground in comparison to
the two percent of the total coal required to be maintained to satisfy the
regulation.'

In Hodel a district court in Virginia found that the Surface Mining
Control and Reclamation Act'34 effected a taking because it "expressly
prohibits mining in certain locations and 'clearly prevent[s] a person
from mining his own land."" 35 The Supreme Court reversed on ripeness grounds because the specific provision held unconstitutional had not
yet taken effect and because no property was identified for evaluation as
to whether the Act would render mining commercially impractical.'36

126. 480 U.S. 470 (1987).
127. 452 U.S. 264 (1981).
128. 52 PA. STAT. ANN. §§ 1406.1-.21 (1998) ("The Bituminous Mine Subsidence and
Land Conservation Act").
129. 480 U.S. at 477 n.7.
130. Id. at 496.
131. Id. at 485 (emphasis added).
132. The "room" and "pillar" method. See id. at 475 n.4.
133. Id.
134. 30 U.S.C. § 1201 to 1328 (1977).
135. 452 U.S. at 294 (quoting Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n v. Andrus,
983 F. Supp. 425, 441 (W.D. Vir. 1981)).
136. Id. at 294-95.
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More recently, in Florida Rock Industries, Inc. v. United States
("FloridaRock"),'37 the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit reviewed the Army Corps of Engineers' refusal to grant a permit,
under the Clean Water Act, 3 ' to Florida Rock Industries to mine
limestone that lay beneath a tract of wetlands. 139 The company
purchased a 1560 acre tract in 1972 specifically for the limestone
beneath the predominantly wetland property. Preliminary mining
operations began in 1972 but were suspended in 1974 because of a
slump in the construction industry. 40
When the company reopened mining in 1978, regulations enacted
pursuant to Section 404 of the Clean Water Act required a permit from
the Army Corps of Engineers to dredge "waters of the United States,
including wetlands." 4 1 Because no permit was acquired by Florida
Rock, the Corps issued a cease and desist order against the company.
The company complied and then sought a permit. Because the Corps
indicated to the company that it would only issue a permit for three
years of mining at a time, the company sought a permit to mine the
limestone under ninety-eight acres of its property. 4 1 The Corps denied
the permit on grounds that the proposed mining would "cause irremediable loss of an ecologically valuable wetland parcel and would create
The company then initiated what
undesirable water turbidity." 143 44
became a fifteen-year legal battle.
Primarily at issue was the question of whether the residual, nonmining value of the property prevented a finding of an uncompensated
taking. The district court held that a partial deprivation resulting from
a regulatory imposition that deprives the owner of a substantial, but not
complete, economic value was still a taking that deserved just compensation.145 The Federal Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and remanded
because the district court failed to consider comparable sales in
determining whether all economic value had been taken. '4 Importantly, however, the court of appeals specifically held that "Inothing in the
language of the Fifth Amendment compels a court to find a taking only

137.
138.

18 F.3d 1560 (Fed. Cir. 1994) [hereinafter FloridaRock IV].
33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1994).

139. FloridaRock V, 18 F.3d at 1562.
140. Id.
141. Florida Rock Indus., Inc. v. United States, 45 Fed. Cl. 21,
Florida Rock V].
142.

Id.

143. FloridaRock V, 18 F.3d at 1563.
144.

FloridaRock V, 45 Fed. Cl. at 25.

145. Id. at 23.
146. FloridaRock V, 18 F.3d at 1573.

25 (1999) [hereinafter
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when the Government divests the total ownership of the property; the
Fifth Amendment prohibits the uncompensated taking of private
property without reference to the owner's remaining property interests."147 The court noted that in cases of physical occupation (a
"categorical" takings analysis) even diminutive physical occupation
merited compensation and stated that "[1logically, the amount of just
compensation should be proportional to the value of the interest taken
as compared to the total value of the property."" Finally, the court
emphasized that a proper regulatory takings analysis is "a classic
exercise of judicial balancing of competing values."149
On remand the district court again found a compensable partial taking
had occurred, holding that "[tihe notion that the government can take
two thirds of your property and not compensate you but must compensate you if it takes 100% has a ring of irrationality, if not unfairness,
about it."50 Quoting the Supreme Court in Armstrong v. United
States,' the district court stated: "The Takings Clause is triggered
by regulation which forces 'some people alone to bear public burdens
which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a
whole."" 52 The court reviewed the actual diminution in value suffered
by Florida Rock and found that the company suffered a seventy-three
percent loss in value because of the regulation, expressly rejecting the
government's defense that the land alternatively could be used for
wildlife observation or hunting by describing those uses as not commercially valuable.'5 3

147. Id. at 1568.
148. Id. at 1569.
149. Id. at 1570 ("'The determination that governmental action constitutes a taking is,
in essence, a determination that the public at large, rather than a single owner, must bear
the burden of an exercise of state power in the public interest.'" Id. at 1570 n.27 (quoting
Agins, 447 U.S. at 260).)
150. Florida Rock V, 45 Fed. Cl. at 23. Chief Judge Smith dismissed outright the
notion that a partial taking was not compensable, stating:
If the law said that those injured by tortious conduct could only have their estate
compensated if they were killed, but not themselves if they could still breathe, no
matter how seriously injured, we would certainly think it odd, if not barbaric. Yet
in takings trials, we have the government trying to prove that the patient has a
few breaths left, while the plaintiffs seek to prove, often at great expense, that the
patient is dead. This all-or-nothing approach seems to ignore the point of the
Takings Clause.
Id. at 23-24.
151. 364 U.S. 40 (1960).
152. Florida Rock V, 45 Fed. Cl. at 24 (quoting Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S.
at 49).
153. Id. at 36-37.

20011

TREE PRESERVATION ORDINANCES

Like mining rights in FloridaRock and Pennsylvania Coal Co., timber
rights are a distinct estate. The right to timber, to paraphrase the Court
in Pennsylvania Coal Co., is the right to harvest it. Like the coal
industry in Pennsylvania, the timber industry is Georgia's leading
industry, and like the statute in Pennsylvania Coal Co., tree ordinances
that so thoroughly regulate the harvest of timber as to make it
commercially impractical are unlawful, uncompensated takings.
Particularly troublesome are tree preservation ordinances that, either
intentionally or through oversight, fail to exempt tree harvesting from
the rest of the requirements imposed by the ordinance. DeKalb County's
ordinance is a good example of just this sort of enactment because it
expressly includes tree harvesting within the activities subject to the
ordinance. " Trees on a harvesting site left to meet the ordinance's
requirements must be protected by four-foot orange tree protection
fencing, which effectively limits the ability to remove other timber. 55
When specimen trees are so interlocked with a stand of trees that
removal of the other trees poses a risk to the specimen tree, the County
Arborist can proscribe timbering any of the trees in the stand. 15 6 Both
the City of Alpharetta and the City of Marietta arguably allow timber
harvest, but Marietta limits the harvest to fifty percent of trees over six
inches in diameter 57 and does not exempt the harvest from the soil
Alpharetta exempts
compaction and encroachment limitations. 5 8
horticultural activities, including farms, from the ordinance but,
somewhat ambiguously, includes lumber harvesting "incidental to
development of the land" and makes no provision exempting timber
harvest from tree-save requirements for specimen trees.' 5 9
The cumulative effect of imposing these development standards on the
commercial harvest is to render commercial harvest impractical and
unprofitable. Gone are the days when trees were individually felled by
hand and dragged out of the forest by oxen. Today machines cut mature
trees with pincers similar to giant garden shears, and skidders haul the
trees to loading platforms. Mandating tree-save areas and protection
zones means these pieces of equipment cannot be used to harvest the
timber for fear of inadvertently compacting a protected root zone or
damaging a specimen tree. Logging, by any description, is not a "neat"

154.

DEKALB, GA., ORDINANCE § 14-39(c)(5).

155. Id. § 14-39(g)(9)(a).
156. Id. § 14-39(g)(8)(c).
157.
158.
159.

MARIE'IrA, GA., CODE § 712.08(D)(2)(a).
Id. § 712.08(H)(2).
ALPHARETTA, GA., CODE § 19-23(a)(2).
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job, and the imposition of these restrictions renders it commercially
impossible.
V.

CRAFTING A "BETTER" ORDINANCE

The primary areas of concern raised by the enactment of tree
ordinances are best categorized by their effects on commercial timber
harvesting and timber harvesting in conjunction with development. The
practical problem that counties encounter in trying to pass these
ordinances is how to encompass timber harvesting in conjunction with
impending development while exempting genuine commercial harvest.
DeKalb County makes no pretenses-it sweeps all timber harvest into
the regulations applicable to development and, thus, goes too far.
In contrast, Fulton County regulates timber harvest according to a
quasi-independent standard-zoning. This regulation reflects the more
common sense approach that true commercial timber production most
likely occurs on land zoned for agriculture.16 ° Fulton County allows
timber harvest on nonagricultural land but only allows thinning, not
clear-cutting, and critically, Fulton County expressly exempts timber
harvesting on agricultural land from the pine specimen tree-save
" '
requirements.16
Apparently, Cobb County has the most liberal
provisions, applying its tree ordinance to land-disturbing activity alone.
Of the three counties, Fulton County's current provisions represent the
most sustainable and logical approach. However, one modification, also
tied to an independent standard, would improve even Fulton County's
ordinance and give heed to the "investment backed expectations"
standard announced by the Court in Penn Central TransportationCo. v.
City of New York. 162 Specifically, it would behoove even Fulton County
to allow an exemption for the clear-cut and pine specimen tree-save
requirements, regardless of zoning, for any property designated as
timber "conservation" 6 ' property for ad valorem tax purposes. Property owners who dedicate their land to conservation demonstrate an
independently verifiable "genuineness" to their timber management and

160. FULTON COUNTY, GA., ADMIN. GUIDELINES § II(A)(3).
161. Id. § III(A)(3).
162. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
163. Conservation designation is a program by which a property owner covenants with
a county that her land lying in the county will not "change" use for a 10-year period in
return for a 25 percent reduction in county ad valorem taxes. If the owner breaches the
covenant, she is liable for the entire amount of the reduction. This covenant is a clear
indication of the use that the property owner intends for her property. Note that although
DeKalb County imposes a five-year development ban on harvested property, the above
described alternative is an affirmative recognition of conservation efforts rather than the
punitive method selected by DeKalb County.
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harvesting activities and should be exempt from the particular harvest
requirements imposed by the zoning of their property.
Equally important is a provision that tree density requirements be
attainable by replanting as opposed to maintenance. Fulton County's
ordinance mandates that even clear-cut tracts must meet a fifteen-unitper-acre-minimum-site density but allows that density to be met by
replanting."
To address county concerns that developers will cut all
significant trees and then replant, a provision similar to that offered by
Marietta is more effective and less likely to trigger takings claims.
Marietta encourages preservation of specimen trees by awarding
additional (double) density credits when specimen trees are saved, thus
halving the total practical density required for any lot.'65
Clearly, timber harvest in conjunction with subsequent development
is the primary focus of most tree ordinances. Here, local authorities
cannot avoid the individualized determination required by the Court in
Dolan v. City of Tigard'6 that their exactions must be roughly proportionate to the impact caused by the particular land use. While even the
Court did not require "precise mathematical calculations," 67 there
must be some effort to tailor the specific requirements to the individual
developments. Blanket enactments that require one- and two-times
replacement standards are suspect unless there is some determination
that this requirement is necessary to offset the impact. It is important
to note that nothing in the language of Dolan suggested that the
exaction had to be roughly proportionate to that necessary to deter the
conduct; it specifically must be proportionate to the impact caused by the
conduct.
In this regard, Fulton County's ordinance takes the better approach,
rewarding reforestation of barren land by doubling the density credits
of trees planted on barren land.'s Quite simply, takings claims do not
exist when the governmental entity reaches its goal by rewarding
developers rather than penalizing them. Further, a developer, as any
good business person who is acutely mindful of cost-benefit analysis, is

164. FULTON COUNTY, GA., ADMIN. GUIDELINES § II(A)(3).
165. MARIETrA, GA., CODE § 712.08(D)(4)(d). Doubling of density credits offsets any
additional profit that would be made from cutting the tree and allows the timber harvester
the freedom to choose. In addition, when tracts are first harvested, developers would
naturally bring pressure on the harvesters to maintain certain trees so that double credit
could be fully utilized-the cooperation between the two industries that this article
encourages.

166. 512 U.S. 374 (1994).
167. Id. at 391.
168. FULTON

COUNTY,GA., ADMIN. GUIDELINES

§ III(C)(1)(b).
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likely to take pains to preserve trees if the economic benefit outweighs
the cost.
Blanket buffer requirements also run afoul of takings scrutiny and
should, instead, be tailored to the individual tract. Across-the-board
buffer requirements for logging operations should yield to buffers
imposed based on proximity to heavily traveled thoroughfares and
residential or commercial development. Even assuming there is some
logic in imposing these buffers, there is no inherent logic in imposing the
exact same buffer on both the road frontage and the back of a tract. A
sliding scale should be used based on the size of the road on which the
property is located, the overall size of the tract, and the tract's proximity
to other development that rightfully needs to be "screened." A tract
located on a dirt road near only one other house simply does not need
the buffer needed by a tract located on a road like Georgia 400.169
Finally, any similar buffer imposed should be released upon completion
of the logging operation, and/or the trees located within those buffers
should be counted toward overall density requirements for any tracts
subsequently developed.
Buffers and no-disturb zones imposed as part of the permitting process
for development must also be tailored to the type of development, the
size of the lots, the proximity to other development, and the topography
of the lots. No provision purporting to prevent the crediting of trees
located in buffer zones toward overall site density requirements should
ever withstand constitutional muster. The one county that elected to
take this route, DeKalb County, further eroded the constitutionality of
its provision by exempting commercial and industrial development from
the restriction.7 ° Fulton County and Cobb County have state-imposed
stream buffer requirements but neither county prohibits counting trees
located in those buffers toward overall site density. This allowance, at
least, provides for some individualized tailoring of subdivision lots
already burdened by the buffer-individualized tailoring that is not
present in the DeKalb ordinance.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The enactment of tree ordinances affect uncompensated takings
primarily in two ways: (1) by requiring the reservation of discrete,
severable real property for a public purpose without individualized
determinations that the impact of the use merits the reservation; and (2)

169. ALPHARETTA, GA., CODE § 19-21. In this regard, the City of Alpharetta arguably
most closely approximates this suggestion, maintaining a 120-foot buffer on Georgia 400.
170. DEKALB, GA., ORDINANCE § 14-39(g)(1).
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by rendering the commercial harvest of timber impractical. Quite
understandably, urban counties do not perceive the impact of forest
industries in the same fashion as rural counties, but no county in the
state is untouched by the industry. With over four million acres of forest
land located in these urban counties, that "touch" remains significant.
As additional counties contemplate the enactment of similar ordinances, cooperation between developers, timber owners, and forest industries
is essential to ensure these ordinances meet the needs of all parties
involved. As more counties move to implement tree ordinances, a statelevel statute, similar to the Historic Preservation Statute, 7 ' would
guide counties toward a more uniform approach and possibly reflect the
needs of the timber industry more fairly without impinging upon the
local government's exclusive authority to zone. Any legislation must
delineate the manner those ordinances are to be enacted and the
individualized determinations necessary to avoid unconstitutional,
uncompensated takings.
There is no dispute that urban forests contribute to the communities
that embrace them or that forests contribute to valid public interests.
But in the race to preserve contributions, authorities must not go too far
and impose a burden on timber owners that, "'in all fairness and justice,
should be borne by the public as a whole."" 72
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O.C.G.A. §§ 44-10-21 to -31 (1981 & Supp. 2000).
FloridaRock V, 45 Fed. C1. at 24 (quoting Armstrong, 364 U.S. at 49).
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